Reconstructing Britain's cities to accommodate the 'motor revolution' was an integral part of urban renewal in the post-war decades. This article shows how opposition to urban motorways had a pivotal role in the retreat from urban modernism in the 1970s. 
In the course of the 1970s, however, the ideal of the motor city collapsed in Britain, and with it the belief in new roads as integral to urban renewal. This collapse was part of a wider retreat from urban modernism as the guiding ethos of post-war urban redevelopment. 11 The reaction against modernism after 1970 has been explored by architectural and planning historians largely in relation to buildings: tower blocks, council estates and Brutalist 'megastructures'. 12 But the retreat from modernism was also manifested in an escalating critique of the engineering vision of the post-war city remodelled around the priorities of the car and free-flowing automobility. In effect, the disavowal of urban modernism encompassed infrastructure as much as buildings and understanding it involves environmental and social history no less than the history of architecture and planning. The case of Birmingham, England's second largest city, shows in especially stark fashion the role of urban motorways in the demise of the techno-utopian ideal, visible also in those industrial cities like Glasgow, Leeds and Bradford where that ideal had been most eagerly embraced. 13 It highlights too the variety of actors involved in the process of unravelling, planners, architects and politicians, to be sure, but also the local and national media, academic experts and community protestors. In this article I examine how Birmingham's motorway network, hailed as a major achievement of civic engineering prior to its final completion in 1972, metamorphosed into an environmental and political disaster that helped to turn the tide of opinion in Britain against the earlier dream of the 'fully motorized' city. It is a detailed and often episodic narrative and one that was consequently not mirrored in exact terms in other towns and cities. The elements of the narrative, encompassing public health, popular protest, technical failures and municipal corruption, can appear as separate, 'disjointed fatalities'. 14 Yet their effects were conjunctural and cumulative, serving to weaken and ultimately destroy the commitment of Birmingham's politicians and planners to the model of the 'motor city' and to reshape urban policy more widely. It is a narrative that has international dimensions, connected to the 'transatlantic collapse of urban renewal' which Christopher Klemek has charted from New York to Berlin. 15 It is part, finally, of the history that is just beginning to be written of Britain's own 'urban crisis' in the later 1970s and early 1980s, marked by de-industrialization, dereliction and 'uprising'. 16 In the conclusion I will return to this wider national and international context and to these larger themes in order to bring out the full significance of the Birmingham case. First, though, we need to analyse the complex series of events that saw the unravelling of motorway mania in Britain's most 'transatlantic city'. I 14 My thanks to one of the anonymous reviewers for this apt phrase. 15 The unravelling started at a motorway interchange. Gravelly Hill Interchange or Spaghetti Junction was intended by its planners to be the final piece in the jigsaw of Birmingham's urban motorway system, linking the Inner Ring Road and Aston Expressway to the major national M6 and M5 motorways. When it was opened in 1972 it represented the largest free-flowing roads interchange in Europe, achieved by a series of curving flyovers, without the need for roundabouts and traffic lights. Within two months, though, the new Interchange was at the centre of a public row about traffic noise and -soon after -potentially dangerous levels of lead pollution believed to derive from vehicle exhaust emissions. These issues, especially lead pollution, were fiercely debated and Birmingham's Gravelly Hill became an important test-case in a national debate about car pollution in Britain that was to last throughout the 1970s.
Concerns about the environmental effects of mass automobility were not new.
The setting up of the Buchanan Study Group on Traffic in Towns in 1961 had been prompted by fears about the consequences of the spread of automobility for the quality of urban life, fears which the ensuing Report intensified rather than dampened. 'All the indications are', Buchanan warned, 'that given its head the car would wreck our towns within a decade'. Proposing both vertical and horizontal segregation of pedestrians and traffic, the Report advocated a new 'traffic architecture' as the basis for the modernisation of Britain's cities alongside the creation of 'environmental areas' in which motor traffic would either be restricted or excluded altogether. 'Environment', in particular the need for environmental protection, was a leitmotif of Buchanan: a town's 'environmental capacity' was calculated in relation to noise level, air pollution and visual blight. 17 Britain was something of an international leader in responding to concerns about traffic and pollution but developments North America also made themselves felt.
As early as 1950 a clear causal link had been made between car exhaust emissions and atmospheric smog in Los Angeles, which notoriously suffered from the problem. Over the decade that followed analyses of urban air pollution in the United States highlighted a number of other damaging effects to health and environment. The American lawyer and anti-car campaigner Ralph Nader argued in 1965 that automobiles were 'pollution factories on wheels' as well as a danger to life and limb. 18 In exactly the same years Birmingham was being recreated as a motor city, then, a number of expert critics in both Britain and North America were raising questions about the effects of mass automobility on the urban environment and public health. In the terms of the period, however, these positions were not viewed as antithetical. Air As an engineering construction it is superb. As a work of art it is one of the greatest monstrosities which any Government has inflicted upon any section of this country.
Nor did the problems recede. In 1974 a local Labour MP, Peter Snape, informed the House of Commons that his constituents 'frequently write to tell me about what they call the "living hell" on their doorsteps -the thundering traffic which makes an unbroken night's sleep a half-forgotten memory'. A survey conducted in the same year suggested that over a third of the urban population of Britain was regularly exposed to 'excessive traffic noise '. 28 Meanwhile, the effects of traffic at Gravelly Hill ignited a still more toxic dispute.
In late 1971, some six months before the Interchange opened, Birmingham's Medical
Officer of Health had instigated a study undertaken by Dr Robert Butler of Aston University into lead in the air from traffic around Gravelly Hill. The study was the first in Britain 'designed to look at the introduction of a motorway interchange in a city and to attempt to relate the consequent atmospheric lead levels with the blood lead levels of residents living nearby'. 29 That motorway traffic was responsible for air pollution was already suspected. Days before the Interchange opened, a local Conservative MP, Sydney Chapman, addressed the Junior Minister for Environment, Eldon Griffiths, in parliament: 'I will hold the dubious distinction of having a constituency [Handsworth] which is almost entirely encircled by urban motorways', Chapman announced. 'There is genuine concern among my constituents about the level of atmospheric pollution'. 30 and that 'more than 90% of airborne lead came from car exhausts '. 31 In part, these divisions among experts related to the different sets of data they correlation between low IQ performance and high levels of lead in teeth of children exposed to heavy urban traffic. 36 Later the same year, scientists working at the Atomic Energy Authority at Harwell appeared to corroborate these views, suggesting that the risks from lead levels 
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Birmingham's self-proclaimed status as a motor city meant that throughout the 1960s it was seen by civil servants and the national press as staunchly pro-car. 39 of unrelieved gloom: more cars and more fumes (one vehicle to every twenty-four yards of road now); more accidents (an estimated one car in eight in an accident this year); more fatalities (nineteen people killed each day last year)'. 54 Only the paradox that the city's motor manufacturing sector was a major contributor to this predicament seemed to escape critics' attention. The powerful motoring lobby including manufacturers' and the major driving organizations, the AA and RAC, were largely silent on Birmingham's problems, concentrating their attention on issues deemed to be of national rather than local importance, such as road safety legislation. 55 That attitudes to automobility were shifting in Birmingham in the early 1970s was confirmed from an altogether different direction, that of pedestrianization. Birmingham city centre was declared a traffic-free zone.
Within the city itself criticism of the roads agenda had become all but universal, even among council leaders. In December 1973 Harold Edwards, who had presided over the Public Works Committee during the last phase of Birmingham's inner motorway construction, acknowledged: 'The time has come when we cannot afford to build any more big urban roads and expressways, not only because they generate traffic, but because of the effects on the environment'. 60 The retreat was at first only partial, not least because large infrastructure works such as the Inner Ring were long-term projects, often taking decades to bring to fruition. Thus on the same day Edwards was signalling the end of major roads construction the City Council was announcing further 57 The result was that, for the first time, a very public debate ensued in Birmingham about the significance and direction of the 'motor revolution' of the previous twenty years. In January 1974, with British industry on a three-day week and oil prices having quadrupled in the previous two months, the Birmingham Post reported on a conference of transport experts at Birmingham University. Speaker after speaker, the Post testified, saw the oil hike as having merely intensified what was a much deeper crisis. The car had become a version of Frankenstein's monster, despoiling the environment while at the same time destroying itself, since mass automobility was outpacing the capacity of the road system to accommodate it. 'Car ownership is theoretically expanding to the nth degree', one speaker explained, 'but land space is not and there is a limit to which we can go in polluting our atmosphere'. Extending Colin Buchanan's notion of the 'motor slum', Janusz Kolbuszewski, Britain's first professor of traffic engineering, proposed the neologism 'slurb' to describe the way in which formerly pleasant suburbs degenerated into slums through planning blight caused by new urban expressways such as the Middle Ring. Above all, the conference emphasized the critical dilemma which a motorized society was now forced to confront: 'Mobility is threatened because we all have it'. As a result, the Post urged, 'government and, indeed, society as a whole need to repairs and fuel doubled in the two years following the crisis. 77 All this brought home the fact that motoring would no longer be either cheap or reliable, despite the promise of North Sea oil. 78 More widely still, the years between 1972 and 1974 were a time of protracted national crisis in Britain -of two miners' strikes, the three-day week and power shortages -which had severe repercussions for industrial and economic activity. 79 In that followed, with 200,000 jobs lost and the workforce at the Longbridge plant halved.
The material effects of de-industrialization were registered both in particular areas of Birmingham and in the region as a whole. In Saltley, beside the Inner Ring, almost half all employment was in vehicle manufacturing; here over 10,000 jobs were lost in the course of the 1970s, while sixty acres of land used for manufacturing industry were left derelict. 'In a traumatic ten years or so', commented Gordon Cherry, 'the economic landscape of the industrial heartland of the West Midlands was fundamentally altered.' 81 The motorcycle industry collapsed and the slowdown in automobile production brought into question its position at the centre of the urban economy, weakening in the process a fundamental prop in the ideal of the motor city. By 1977 the extent of unemployment, poverty and dereliction in parts of the city meant that Birmingham was one of four 'inner areas', along with Manchester/Salford, London docklands and Lambeth, to qualify for a £41 million grant under the Labour government's urban programme. 82 The transition from the boom city of the 1960s to the 'inner city' of the seventies in Birmingham was swift and savage. 83 Birmingham, of course, was not unique. In much of Britain ambitious roads programmes were pared back or shelved in the course of the 1970s, urban motorways above all. Organized opposition in London proved strong enough to put an end to the Motorway Box in 1973, the inner motorway of which the Westway was an early foretaste, as well as the larger Ringways scheme which had been the centrepiece of the Greater London Plan. Here housing not pollution was the major issue, whether in the form of the deleterious impact on living conditions in houses bordering urban motorways or in the threat to property prices in the ring of gentrifying areas through which the Motorway Box was scheduled to pass. 84 Elaborate road schemes for the cities of York and Bath were also withdrawn following mass protests against damage to historic buildings and townscape. 85 But it was in industrial centres where the motor city ideal had been taken up with greatest alacrity that events in Birmingham resonated most forcefully. In 1974 the Newcastle-based protest group Save Our City from Environmental Mess (SOCEM) cited noise and lead pollution at Spaghetti Junction as well as the dire consequences for the neighbouring communities in its campaign against the construction of the Central Motorway East in the early 1970s. The campaign was unsuccessful in the short term but the group's efforts were sufficient to halt much of the rest of the roads programme on Tyneside thereafter. By 1975 the 'motorway city' label applied to Leeds was being described locally as a 'menace' and the City Council was reporting levels of lead nine times the recommended figure on sections of the inner ring. In Liverpool, which lagged behind in roads as much else, the grandiose Inner Motorway scheme proposed by Graeme Shankland in 1962 was never built; it was replaced by a more modest ring road scheme which, nevertheless, remained largely in abeyance into the 1980s. Notoriously, too, Glasgow's Inner Ring Road was only halffinished, being abandoned in 1972, the section in the Tradeston area of the city concluding dramatically in mid-air, known locally as the 'ski-jump'. 86 In every British city, so it seemed, the roads agenda was under pressure during the 1970s from protests and costs. But as Britain's principal motor city, the case of 
